On the basis of the analysis of the average and dispersion values of inflation, unemployment and GDP growth during 1971–2006, the author reveals the main features of Fed and ECB monetary policy and compares them in the light of modern monetary theory and globalizations problems. The article argues that both central banks are pursuing a policy of price stability, being ECB more conservative, and, as compared to Fed, there exists a genetic connection between the policies of ECB and Bundesbank

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The article analyzes various theoretical approaches to the problem of coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. On the basis of empirical analysis, the author establishes this character of the mixpolicy: fiscal policy functions as an automatic stabilizer, while monetary policy ensures price stability, hence the former is flexible and the latter is conservative. That phenomenon may be determined by the globalization, which is, however, not powerful enough to exert a unifying influence on mixpolicy variants in individual developed countries.

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The author proposes a method to adapt the theory of optimal currency areas to the modern tendencies of the fluctuations of global liquidity. He proves that symmetry of financial systems and common approaches to the provision of macroeconomic stability and macroeconomic reactions to financial cycle is an important criterion of optimality of a modern currency area. The article argues for the revaluation of the stabilizing role of exchange rate under the shocks of global demand

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The necessity to return into the scholarly use of the institutional theory of the term "institution" is advocated in this essay. The economic nature of the institutions and the logic of their relations with organizations and other bodies is revealed. The arguments are produced which prove that the institutions are an essential foundation of the arrangements. More accurate definitions of these notions are offered.

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The article deals with the impact of the global financial instability on the institutional environment of Ukraine’s monetary policy. The author proves that the need to perform their constitutional functions makes the central banks extent their activities on the adjacent areas of financial market, which creates additional risks and costs for the government’s monetary policy

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Revealed the controversial role of fiscal policy in ensuring an optimum currency area. It is shown that bridging the differences between the fiscal convergence and stabilization opportunity to respond to asymmetrical shocks in the theory comes down to creating a fiscal union. It is proved that the specif-ics of the crisis in the EMU is a combination of the loss of fiscal discipline, financial imbalances and asymmetric loss of competitiveness under the conditions of low real interest rates. Confirmed the assumption that the capacity of the stabilizing reaction to asymmetrical shocks is rooted in the policy of reducing public debt. Theoretical behavior of the indicator of "Maastricht primary budget balance" demonstrates that the decline in real interest rates has created a favorite environment for the em-powerment of fiscal policy to respond to shocks, but this opportunity was lost due to the loss of fiscal discipline. It is proved that the system of centralized transfers is the politically and institutionally vul-nerable, as different countries are at different stages of real convergence. Centralization should be implemented in the direction of strengthening the rules that aims at reducing the debt load, after it had risen as a result of previous stabilization needs. Insurance system of sovereign risk must exist as a last resort and based on the principle of due credit.

Keywords:fiscal policy, the theory of optimum currency areas, fiscal convergence, fiscal union, EMU convergence

Macroeconomic and institutional distortions in the resource rich countries potentially should restrain the financial development, which is argued in a series of empirical findings. However, the present paper shows that, by index of financial development, such countries are at the average world level as world mean. This paradox may be explained by the heterogeneity of commodity countries. It is as-sumed that the nature of such heterogeneity is based on a mix of political regime and ability to accu-mulate exchange reserves as an institutional manifestation of the characteristic features of the distri-bution of resource rent. Typologically the commodity countries should reflect some mix of the level of democracy, reserves accumulation and level of financial development. Basing on the empirical analy-sis, 52 resource-rich countries are grouped in eight groups that represent theoretically meaningful relations between political regime, level of reserves accumulations and level of financial development. An undeniable inverse relationship between the richness of resources and level of democracy is found. At the same time, level of democracy is positively related with financial development when country is advanced in reforming and less dependent on forex reserves. Autocracies may support financial development only in the case of an implicit consensus about the increase in social welfare, which, in turn, requires large reserves. With reserve accumulation and financial development, weak democracies perform better than expropriative autocracies. It is proved that ability to accumulate reserves is a sign of how institutions avoid to waste the rent when resource richness is abnormal. In the case of low and moderate resource richness, the policy to increase the quality of institutions should be on frontier to facilitate financial development that, together with a more flexible exchange rate, will allow maintaining macrostability at a lower level of forex reserves.

Keywords:resource richness, commodity export, political regime, exchange reserves, financial de-velopment, quality of institutions, monetary regime, intertemporal savings

The vulnerability of resource rich countries to trade shocks is further complicated due to capital flow reverses as drivers of macrofinancial instability. That opens the space for expanding the policy-mix tool-kit of macroprudential regulation that makes it possible to mitigate the conflict between price stability, exchange rates stability and financial stability, which is a challenge to efficient monetary policy. Hypothetically, the factor of resource richness could be a quite important motivator for intensifying the use of macroprudential regulation. This hypothesis is tested on a sample of 117 resource common countries and 38 resource rich countries. In first approximation this hypothesis looks valid taking into account the results of regression analysis. In the same time it looks paradoxical that transition to macroprudential regulation is corresponded with exchange rate flexibility and the mean macroprudential policy index in the group of inflation targeting countries is somewhat higher than in the resourcerich countries. It is possible to explain such a paradox by the heterogeneity of commodity exporting countries as to the combination of policy regime and the nature of macroeconomic adjustment that together reflect the institutional format of rent distribution. Grouping resourcerich countries by “policy regime – exchange rate regime” allows to identify the following three modalities of macroprudential policy: The first one reflects the development of countercyclical instruments outside the commodity factor of the procyclicality of financial system; the second one represents a continuation of the policy of capital flow regulation; and the third one is a way to maintain stability and control over the financial system. The first modality is used in mature democracies with flexible ex-change rate. The second one is characteristic for – in the nonmature democracies with rigid exchange rate regimes. And the third one – in the autocracies with a strong role of sovereign wealth funds as a counter-cyclical tool. It is concluded that commodity factor of financial instability in Ukraine should be in the focus of further development of the macroprudential toolkit.

Keywords: macro-prudential policy, commodity economy, financial stability, capital flows, external shocks.

The effectiveness of self-stimulating environmental regimes in unsteady economic systems is considered in the article on the basis of the conducted behavioral experiment. It is shown that rational choice, as a methodological basis is not always a sufficient prerequisite for the development of effective environmental regimes. It is substantiated that the initial level of well-being may determine the preferences of economic entities regarding environmental benefits. It is noted that in conditions of low priority of social welfare and ecology, at the individual level there is no reason to believe that collective actions to increase the supply of environmental goods will be successful. It is revealed that the potential for replication of altruistic strategies is rather weak, and they are almost entirely offset by rent-invading behavior, while collective actions do not generate a proper emergent order in which opportunistic behavior would be subject to more stringent restrictions. In general, the results of the experiment indicate an increase in the effect of the gap between the individual rational rent-invading choices and the collective result, which leads to the degradation of the environment, which accordingly calls into question the expediency of creating a decentralized mechanism for financing the benefit of «clean ecology» in Ukraine. It is substantiated that in the short term, the very tools of environmental policy that will be based on the use of individuals to benefit from the implementation of such a policy and pushing them out will be potentially successful. However, in the long run, the improvement of the situation in the field of environmental goods may be based on changes in preferences that are not always strictly determined by the level of income, in particular, environmental policy should be associated with those changes in institutional quality and education that would be relevant to changes in preferences.

Keywords: behavioral experiment, public goods, ecological regime, rational choice, economic operators' preferences

The effectiveness of self-stimulating environmental regimes in unsteady economic systems is considered in the article on the basis of the conducted behavioral experiment. It is shown that rational choice, as a methodological basis is not always a sufficient prerequisite for the development of effective environmental regimes. It is substantiated that the initial level of well-being may determine the preferences of economic entities regarding environmental benefits. It is noted that in conditions of low priority of social welfare and ecology, at the individual level there is no reason to believe that collective actions to increase the supply of environmental goods will be successful. It is revealed that the potential for replication of altruistic strategies is rather weak, and they are almost entirely offset by rentinvading behavior, while collective actions do not generate a proper emergent order in which opportunistic behavior would be subject to more stringent restrictions. In general, the results of the experiment indicate an increase in the effect of the gap between the individual rational rent-invading choices and the collective result, which leads to the degradation of the environment, which accordingly calls into question the expediency of creating a decentralized mechanism for financing the benefit of «clean ecology» in Ukraine. It is substantiated that in the short term, the very tools of environmental policy that will be based on the use of individuals to benefit from the implementation of such a policy and pushing them out will be potentially successful. However, in the long run, the improvement of the situation in the field of environmental goods may be based on changes in pref-erences that are not always strictly determined by the level of income, in particular, environmental policy should be associated with those changes in institutional quality and education that would be relevant to changes in preferences.

Keywords:behavioral experiment, public goods, ecological regime, rational choice, economic operators' preferences

Which institutional factors substantially affect macroeconomic performance or regulatory design is still under question and is discussed heavily. Institutional qual-ity variables are often opposed to variables that are cultural attributes. The prob-lem of relations between central banks independence and inflation also could be considered from that discussion viewpoint. From one point of view, culture should shape preferences that are expected to be converted into public choice. From another, institutional quality determines how preferences are correlated with particular policy-making following the initially taken commitments. The paper introduces the hypothesis that quality of institutions should override the cultural attrib-utes as an inflation performance factor. It is because of some reasons. Cultural attributes may affect macroeconomic performance produced by regulators in opposite ways. As well, institutional quality may distort relations between culture, preferences and public choice. This hypothesis is tested empirically. The basic regression based on variables that are proxies for institutional quality and policy-mix is added by variables from World Values Map and Hofstede cultural attributes. It is found that law enforcement is the most statistically meaningful variable. Central bank independence is also counter-inflationary as traditional theory assumes. The same applies to fiscal buffers and smaller resource endowments. Political regime is also important but fractionalization of society demonstrates some ambiguity. Survival values are proinflationary in democracies. But power distance could be counter-inflationary in some cases opposite to standard view. At the same time, relations between cultural proxies and inflation are not always obvious and should be considered in the particular institutional context. The general conclusion is that variables that are closer matching policy-making process are better in shaping the macroeconomic performance. Due to this, quality of institutions as well as institutional design of regulators are better in capturing macroeconomic performance than cultural drivers of potential macroeconomic preferences.

Keywords:central banks independence, inflation, quality of institutions, cultural attributes, rule of law, political regimes

The rising cryptocurrencies have revived discussion about the prospects of monetary order and the central bank’s role in it. Functionality is in the core of the competition between the forms of money and the payment landscape could be fractionalized affecting further decline in the efficiency of monetary policy. Central bank digital currency (CBDC) is looked by monetary authorities as a way to respond to technological challenge and fulfill the gap of the market failure related to some imperfections of privately issued digital money. The success of each money form is dependent on the trust as a collective experience. The paper raises the question if the central banks are more credible than private digital money when probable change in the age structure matters for the spread of fintech. Based on empirical analysis, it is found that economic agents differentiate digital money of central banks from those of private issuers. Private cryptocurrencies are considered more reliable when inflationary experience is stronger, while central banks’ independence level and financial stability are not factors of higher trust to CBDC.
Also, a country’s institutional features do not indicate that successful central banks can use the “the umbrella” of trust to their own cryptocurrencies while the factors of technological advance fail to show a clear significance. Social capital better contributes to the trust to private digital money. At the same time, the age structure is the strong factor due to which digital currencies are more reliable in younger societies. It is concluded that in the case then trust in cryptocurrencies is not grounded on institutional factors that historically contributed to stability of the monetary order, preconditions for the latter’s higher vulnerability are likely to rise. With the growing role of age structure as a factor of higher trust to digital money, the quality of social interactions will become a very important institutional precondition for the stability of monetary order.

Keywords:central bank digital currency, money confidence, cryptocurrencies, population age structure, quality of institutions