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№ 3/2004
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
The institute of confidence in monetary coordinates
Ekon. teor. 2004; 3:0-0 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The author considers the institute of confidence in monetary coordinates, in particular, the vector of confidence to money as an asset, monetary institutes in which it develops, and their architectonics and dynamics. Special attention is given to the research on genesis and efficiency of monetary regimes.
Keywords:
Article in Russian (pp. 28 - 52) | Download | Downloads :223 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 28 - 51) | Download | Downloads :251 |
REFERENCES ▼
№ 2/2007
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Formation of the informational-and-bihavioral paradigm of monetary policy
Ekon. teor. 2007; 2:0-0 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The article deals with the new paradigm of monetary economics proposed by J.Stiglitz and B.Grinwald based on the economic theory of information: its input provisions, microeconomic bases, approach to macroeconomic equilibrium and conclusions for monetary policy.
Keywords:
Article in Russian (pp. 46 - 70) | Download | Downloads :229 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 46 - 69) | Download | Downloads :275 |
REFERENCES ▼
№ 3/2009
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Logico-historical analysis of trust in the context of socio-economic relations
Ekon. teor. 2009; 3:0-0 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The author considers the scientific approaches to the definition and typology of trust. She attempts to investigate the development of the phenomenon of trust in different historical periods and its reflection in the works by the thinkers of corresponding ages. The article shows the difference in the economic approach to the understanding of the phenomenon of trust from the sociological one.
Keywords:
Article in Russian (pp. 5 - 18) | Download | Downloads :263 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 5 - 18) | Download | Downloads :332 |
REFERENCES ▼
№ 3/2010
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
The globalization and the evolution of the macroeconomic component of the trust to the government
Ekon. teor. 2010; 3:0-0 |
ABSTRACT ▼
Keywords:
Article in Russian (pp. 80 - 89) | Download | Downloads :249 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 80 - 88) | Download | Downloads :259 |
REFERENCES ▼
№ 1/2012
KRYCHEVSKA Tetiana 1, BALIUK O. V.
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Ukrainian society and economy in the sociological assessments of the degree of trust: internal measures and inter-country comparisons
Ekon. teor. 2012; 1:0-0 |
ABSTRACT ▼
Based on the analysis of intercountry and national sociological polls, the authors reveal the features and generalities of the global distribution of trust (both interpersonal trust and trust to institutions), and Ukraine's place in the corresponding ratings, and the peculiarities and dynamics of trust in Ukrainian society.
Keywords:
Article in Russian (pp. 50 - 64) | Download | Downloads :269 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 50 - 64) | Download | Downloads :267 |
REFERENCES ▼
№ 3/2013
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Monetary stimulation of the economy: modern theoretical discussions and practical approaches
Ekon. teor. 2013; 3:0-0 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The article investigates the problem of the assessment of the efficiency of the functioning of socioeconomic systems. The authors propose a methodological approach to the realization of the hierarchic measuring of the efficiency of such systems based on the modeling of their balanced indicators.
Keywords:
Article in Russian (pp. 63 - 89) | Download | Downloads :264 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 63 - 89) | Download | Downloads :281 |
REFERENCES ▼
№ 4/2014
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
History of the institutions of monetary regulation in the United States Article 1. The pre-fed institutions of monetary regulation
Ekon. teor. 2014; 4:0-0 |
ABSTRACT ▼
This is the first article of the series of articles about the development of the institutions of monetary regulation in the United States. The investigation aims to search for answers to the question of who de facto shapes the monetary policy, of the peculiarities of relationships between central bank and ministry of finance, and the prospects of some "new" monetary instruments that are actually the well-forgotten old ones. Analysis of the monetary institutions is carried out in the context of economic insti-tutions, economic ideas and theories, and opposition of political parties. The article is devoted to the history of the five institutions of monetary regulation in the United States, which complemented the metal standard at various times before the creation of the Fed. These are the First and Second Banks of the United States, the national banking system, the US Treasury and the Clearing House Associa-tion. It is shown that the initiative to develop a system of monetary management beyond the metal standard came from the US Treasury, which, from the founding of the United States to the creation of the Fed permanently increased its influence in the monetary system. The monetary functions of the US Treasury at different stages are considered. It is shown that the most successful countercyclical activities in monetary field of the two institutions - the US Treasury and the Clearing Houses Associa-tion - become the building blocks for the creation of the US Federal Reserve System in 1913.
Keywords:institution of monetary regulation, central bank, First Bank of the United States, Second Bank of the United States, US Treasury, national banking system, Clearing House Association, banks, bank notes, money creation, treasury bills
JEL: N11
Article in Russian (pp. 79 - 105) | Download | Downloads :264 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 79 - 105) | Download | Downloads :290 |
REFERENCES ▼
Rotbard M. (2009) Istorija denezhnogo obrashhenija i bankovskogo dela v SShA: ot kolonial'nogo perioda do Vtoroj mirovoj vojny; per. s angl. B.S. Pinskera pod red. A.V. Kurjaeva. Cheljabinsk: Socium.
№ 1/2015
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
History of the institutions of monetary regulation in the United States Article 2. The federal reserve in search of balance between gold standard protector, bank of banks and bank of government functions (1913–1951)
Ekon. teor. 2015; 1:0-0 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The economic, political, institutional and scientific principles for the creation of the Federal Reserve are considered. While the establishment of the first European central banks meant the move to the currency related to national debt, the establishment of the Federal Reserve in the US, by contrast, was an attempt to move away from the issue of national banks notes against government securities to the currency, reflecting variable needs of business and issued under the collateral of bills accepted by federal reserve banks for rediscount.
With the outbreak of World War II, in the belligerent states, private individuals reacting to price incentives were largely replaced as the major international traders by the governments. Accordingly, the dynamics of the gold flows had thence to be responded by states, not by markets. It was not provided by Federal Reserve Act which assumed the full operation of the gold standard. Yet the Fed response to this external challenge was more active than to the domestic ones. The Federal Reserve Act clearly established the ratios of reserves for bank notes and deposits, so the Fed protected them during the outflow of gold in the 1920s and early 1930s by raising the discount rates. The Fed has been much less willing to respond to internal challenges like the boom of the 1920s, banking crises of 1931 and 1933 and the Great Depression, as the real bills doctrine meant essentially passive policy of following the market. Domestic government economic objectives were not formulated at all given the dominance of laissez-faire doctrine. The Employment Act was passed only in 1946, after the effectiveness of government spending policy had been confirmed in practice. Federal Reserve decentralization also contributed to the lack of coordinated actions during the banking crisis. In the midst of the Great Depression in 1932 and in 1933 acts were passed temporary allowing Federal Reserve banks to issue banknotes against government securities. The Banking Act of 1935 finalized the conversion of FED into the political body: it centralized the authority in the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and reduced independence of the Federal Reserve banks, expanded their possibilities of conducting open market operations with government securities, and centralized their conduct in Federal Open Market Committee. The idea of money supply elasticity to furnish business needs through bills rediscounting was buried. By 1951 the Fed was not to be independent of the Ministry of Finance, as the authors of the law expected about the Fed. The Fed supported the Treasury in the placement of government securities. If in the 1930th recession was no longer considered an inevitable reaction to the speculative excesses, in 1950th inflation too ceased to be regarded only as a result of speculation. The Fed was becoming an active institution managing the aggregate demand and inflation by manipulating short-term interest rates. The age of complex relationships between the Fed and the Treasury as the two independent macroeconomic managers having different responsibilities, but closely related through the government securities market and the money market had started.
Keywords:Federal Reserve, US Treasury, monetary policy, the gold standard, real bills doctrine, banking crisis, the Great Depression, government securities, rediscounting, open market operations, trust, interest rates, banks
JEL: N12
Article in Russian (pp. 50 - 73) | Download | Downloads :227 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 50 - 73) | Download | Downloads :277 |
REFERENCES ▼
100 Years Federal Reserve System. (1913) The Act To provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes, December 23, 1913 www.federalreservehistory.org/Media/Material/Event/10-58.
100 Years Federal Reserve System. (1935) Banking Act of 1935. An Act To provide for the sound, effective, and uninterrupted operation of the banking system, and for other purposes. www.federalreservehistory.org/Media/Material/Event/26-284
100 Years Federal Reserve System. (1951) Joint announcement by the Secretary of the Treasure and the Chairman of the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee, of the Federal Reserve System. Release Morning Newspapers, Sunday, March 4, 1951. www.federalreservehistory.org/Media/Material/Event/30-171
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2014) Membership of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1914-Present Historical Notes // www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/boardmembership.htm
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2013). Federal Re-serve Act. Section 16. Note Issues / www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section16.htm
Eagle Traders. Federal Reserve Notes www.eagletraders.com/advice/securities/federal_reserve_notes.php.
Engemann K. M. Banking Panics of 1931–33. (2013). www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/21.
Federal Reserve Bulletin. (1932) March. – Washington. An Act To improve the facilities of the Federal reserve system for the service of commerce, industry, and agriculture, to provide means for meeting the needs of member banks in exceptional circumstances, and for other purposes. 1932. – P. 180–181 / fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/FRB/1930s/frb_031932.pdf
FRASER. Federal Reserve Achive. (1933) Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933. fraser.stlouisfed.org/scribd/?item_id=15952&filepath=%2Fdocs%2Fhistorical%2Fny+circulars%2F1933_01248.pdf#scribd-open
FRASER. Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. (1946). An Act To declare a national policy on employment, production, and purchasing power. fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/congressional/employment-act-1946.pdf
Friedman M., Schwartz A. J. (1963) A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hearing Before the Committee On Banking And Currency House of Representatives. Eightieth Congress. First Session on H. R. 2233 Superceded By H. R. 2413. (1947). Direct Purchases Of Government Securities By Federal Reserve Banks. An Act To Amend The Federal Reserve Act, And For Other Purposes
Hetzel R. (2008) Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve: A History. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Internet Archive. (1933) Banking Act of 1933. archive.org/details/FullTextTheGlass-steagallActA.k.a.TheBankingActOf1933
Meltzer A. H. (2003). A History of the Federal Reserve. – Volume 1: 1913-1951. – Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Richardson G. , Komai A., Gou M. (2013) Banking Act of 1935. www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/26
The National Agricultural Law Center. (1933) Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 Р. 51–54. nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/farmbills/1933.pdf
Timberlake R. (1986) Institutional Evolution of Federal Reserve Hegemony. Cato Journal. Vol. 5. № 3. Р. 743–769.
Timberlake R. (1993) Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutional History. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
Waiwood P. (2013) Recession of 1937–38. May 1937–June 1938
www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/27.
№ 1/2016
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
History of the institutions of monetary regulation in the United States. Article 4.
Ekon. teor. 2016; 1:0-0 |
ABSTRACT ▼
This is the fourth and final part of the series on the development of institutions of monetary regulation in the United States. The article covers the period in the history of the Fed, when economic theory and political environment allowed it to make maximum use of monetary policy to perform both parts of its mandate. The author reveals the anatomy of success of P.Volcker’s anti-inflationary policy and various specific features in the implementation of the Fed\'s goals of price stability and employment in the era of Greenspan. It is proposed to also look at the role of the third objective specified in the Federal Reserve Act, which is targeting moderate long-term interest rates
Keywords:Federal Reserve, US Treasury, anti-inflation policy, monetary aggregates, trust, inflation expectations, the federal funds rate, long-term interest rates, credit control, financial deregulation, recovery without job creation, employment, price stabil
JEL: N12
REFERENCES ▼
Hrytsenko A.A., Krychevska T.O. (2006). Serednostrokova monetarna stratehiia: zarubizhnyi dosvid ta osnovni zasady formuvannia v Ukraini [Medium-term Monetary Strategy: International Experience and Basic Principles of Formation in Ukraine]. In-t ekon. ta prohnozuv. – Kiev.( In Ukrainian)
Radzhan R. (2011) Linii razloma: skrytye treshhiny, vse eshhe ugroz-hajushhie mirovoj jekonomike [Fault Lines: Hidden Cracks, Still Threatening the Global Economy]. Moskva: Izd. Instituta Gajdara.( In Russian)
Samujel\'son P. (2010). O chem dumajut jekonomisty: Besedy s nobe-levskimi laureatami [What do they Think Economists: Conversations with Nobel Laureates]/ pod red. P.Samujel\'sona i U.Barnetta; per. s angl., 2-e izd. Moskva: OOO \"Junajted Press\". ( In Russian)
Goodfriend M. Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper 85–7, August 1984. (In English)
Greenspan A. (1996a) Achieving Price Stability. Opening remarks. Jackson Hole, Wyoming: A symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. August 29–31. www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/1996/pdf/s96green.pdf. (In English)
Greenspan A. (1996b) The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society. Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture. Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. December 5, 1996. www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm (In English)
Greenspan A. (2013) The Map And The Territory: Risk, Human Nature, and the Future of Forecasting. New York: The Penguin Press. (In English)
Hetzel R. (2008) Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (In English)
Meltzer A. H. (2009). A History of the Federal Reserve. Volume 2. Book 2: 1970–1986. Chicago: Chicago University Press. (In English)
Screft S. Credit Controls: 1980 // FRB Richmond Economic Review. 1990. Vol. 76. № 6. November/December. PP. 25–55. (richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_review/1990/pdf/er760603.pdf) (In English)
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF MONETARY REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES. ARTICLE 3. The formation of countercyclical monetary policy and the ascent of Keynesianism in the United States (1951–1979)
Ekon. teor. 2016; 1:67-85 | https://doi.org/10.15407/etet2016.01.067 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The third article of the series, devoted to the history of monetary regulation institutions in the United States. The article considers the development of counter-cyclical monetary policy of the Fed and the mechanisms of its coordination with the Treasury. It also examines the modification of monetary policy under the influence of strengthening the position of Keynesianism in economics and politics
Keywords: Federal Reserve, US Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers, Federal Reserve independence, trust, employment, money market, open market operations, bills only policy, even keel policy, coordination, Keynesian theory, policy of prices and wages contro
JEL: N12
Article in Russian (pp. 67 - 85) | Download | Downloads :554 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 67 - 85) | Download | Downloads :287 |
REFERENCES ▼
2. Axilrod, S.H. (2009). Inside the Fed: Monetary Policy and Its Management, Martin through Greenspan to Bernanke. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: The MIT Press.
3. Brunner, K., Meltzer, A. (1964). The Federal Reserve’s Attachment to the Free Reserve Concept A Staff Analysis. Subcommittee on Domestic Finance Committee on Banking and Currency. House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 2d Session.
4. Burns, A.F. (1979). The Anguish of Central Banking. The 1979 Per Jacobsson Lecture. Belgrade: Per Jacobsson Foundation.
5. Fand, D.I., Scott, I.O. (1958). The Federal Reserve System's "Bills Only" Policy: A Suggested Interpretation. The Journal of Business, 31: 1, 12-18. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/294166">doi.org/10.1086/294166">https://doi.org/10.1086/294166
6. Friedman, M., Schwartz, A. (1963). A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
7. Hetzel, R. (2008) Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754173">doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754173">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754173
8. Meltzer, A. (2009a). A History of the Federal Reserve, 1951-1969.Vol. 2, Book 1. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
9. Meltzer, A.H. (2009b). A History of the Federal Reserve, 1970-1986. Vol. 2, Book 2. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
10. Samuelson, P., Solow, R. (1966). Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy (1960). In Stiglitz J. (Ed.). The Collected Scientific Papers of P. Samuelson, Vol. 2, p. 102. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
11. Kennedy, John F. (1961, February 2). The American Presidency Project. Special Message to the Congress: Program for Economic Recovery and Growth. Retrieved from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8111/
12. The American Presidency Project (1962). Economic Report of the President. Retrieved from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/1962.pdf/
13. The American Presidency Project (1966). Economic Report of the President. Retrieved from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/1966.pdf/
14. Nixon R. (1971, August 15). The American Presidency Project. Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: "The Challenge of Peace." Retrieved from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3115/
15. The American Presidency Project (1973). Economic Report of the President. Retrieved from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/1973.pdf/
№ 2/2016
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF MONETARY REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARTICLE 4. From the formation of systemic anti-inflationary policy to encouraging the economy with the help of a creative financial sector (1977-2007)
Ekon. teor. 2016; 2:46-62 | https://doi.org/10.15407/etet2016.02.046 |
ABSTRACT ▼
This is the fourth and final part of the series on the development of institutions of monetary regulation in the United States. The article covers the period in the history of the Fed, when economic theory and political environment allowed it to make maximum use of monetary policy to perform both parts of its mandate. The author reveals the anatomy of success of P.Volcker’s anti-inflationary policy and various specific features in the implementation of the Fed's goals of price stability and employment in the era of
Greenspan. It is proposed to also look at the role of the third objective specified in the Federal Reserve Act, which is targeting moderate long-term interest rates.
Keywords:Federal Reserve, US Treasury, anti-inflation policy, monetary aggregates, trust, inflation expectations, the federal funds rate, long-term interest rates, credit control, financial deregulation, recovery without job creation, employment, price stabil
JEL: N12
Article in Russian (pp. 46 - 62) | Download | Downloads :382 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 46 - 62) | Download | Downloads :289 |
REFERENCES ▼
2. Hrytsenko, A.A., Krychevska, T.O. (2006). Medium-term Monetary Strategy: International Experience and Basic Principles of Formation in Ukraine. Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine. Kyiv [in Ukrainian].
3. Radzhan, R. (2011). Fault Lines: Hidden Cracks, Still Threatening the Global Economy. Moscow: Izd. Instituta Gajdara [in Russian].
4. Samuelsson, P. (2010). What do they Think Economists: Conversations with Nobel Laureates. Moscow: OOO "Junajted Press" [in Russian].
5. Goodfriend, M. (August 1984). Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper 85-7.
6. Greenspan, A. (1996a). Achieving Price Stability. Opening remarks. Jackson Hole, Wyoming: A symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. August 29-31. Retrieved from www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/1996/pdf/s96green.pdf
7. Greenspan, A. (1996b). The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society. Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture. Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. December 5. Retrieved from www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm
8. Greenspan, A. (2013). The Map and The Territory: Risk, Human Nature, and the Future of Forecasting. New York: The Penguin Press.
9. Hetzel, R. (2008). Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754173">doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754173">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754173
10. Meltzer, A.H. (2009). A History of the Federal Reserve. Vol. 2. Book 2: 1970-1986. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
11. Screft, S. (1990). Credit Controls: 1980. FRB Richmond Economic Review, 76:6, 25-55. Retrieved from richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_review/1990/pdf/er760603.pdf
№ 3/2017
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Monetary policy as an institution to ensure confidence in money and banking system: logical-historical analysis
Ekon. teor. 2017; 3:64-100 | https://doi.org/10.15407/etet2017.03.064 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The article presents the logic of the evolution of monetary policy as an institution to ensure confidence in the currency and banking system from the 7th century BC to 1970th. Understanding of this logic is necessary for policy making as well as for institutional construction. It comprises the stages of recursive support of trust in currency and the authority of the sovereign; quality assurance of coins by deposit-clearing banks; support of foreign expansion of the states by central banks; the birth of banking system stability goal for central banks activity due to the formation of a centralized reserve system; support of domestic confidence in the currency through the foreign confidence; different a combinations of monetary and fiscal policy, depending on the challenges changing the role of government and markets in the economy and changes in the behavior of economic agents responding to public policy.
Keywords: trust in the monetary unit, trust in banking system, coin, sovereign, deposit and settlement bank, state, central bank, monetary policy, fiscal policy, rational expectations, time inconsistency, monetary regime, credibility of monetary policy
JEL: N10
Article in Russian (pp. 64 - 100) | Download | Downloads :593 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 64 - 100) | Download | Downloads :418 |
REFERENCES ▼
2. Hrytsenko, A.A. (2005). Development of the forms of exchange, value and money. Kyiv: Osnova [in Russian].
3. Hrytsenko, A., Krychevska, T. (2005). The monetary strategy: the way to the effective monetary policy. Article 1. The necessity and prerequisite of forming of the monetary strategy concerning the public relations of central banks. Visnyk NBU – Bulletin of the NBU, 11, 8-18 [in Ukrainian].
4. Krychevska, T.O. (2015). History of the institutions of monetary regulation in the United States. Article 2. The Federal Reserve in search of balance between gold standard protector, bank of banks and bank of government functions (1913-1951). Ekon. teor. – Economic theory, 1, 50-73 [in Ukrainian].
5. Krychevska, T.O. (2016a). History of the institutions of monetary regulation in the United States. Article 3. The formation of countercyclical monetary policy and the ascent of Keynesianism in the United States (1951-1979). Ekon. teor. – Economic theory, 1, 67-85 in Ukrainian].
6. Krychevska, T.O. (2016b). History of the institutions of monetary regulation in the United States. Article 4. From the formation of systemic anti-inflationary policy to encouraging the economy with the help of a creative financial sector (1977-2007). Ekon. teor. – Economic theory, 2, 46-62 [in Ukrainian].
7. Krychevska, T.O. (2016). Monetary policy as part of social contract: the logical and historical analysis. Ekonomist – Economist, 5, 4-11 [in Ukrainian].
8. Mankiv, G. (2000). Macroeconomics. Kyiv: Osnovy [in Ukrainian].
9. Bundesbank: monetary policy problems and instruments (1993). Frankfurt: Special'nye izdanija Nemeckogo federal'nogo banka, 7 [in Russian].
10. Samujel'son, P. (2010). Inside the economist’s mind: Conversation with eminent economists. 2-nd ed. Moscow: OOO "Junajted Press" [in Russian].
11. Ujerta de Soto, J. (2008). Money, bank credit and economic cycles. Cheljabinsk: Socium [in Russian].
12. Shaht, Ja. (2011). Confessions of the Old Wizard. Moscow: Centrpoligraf [in Russian].
13. 100 Years Federal Reserve System (1951). Joint announcement by the Secretary of the Treasure and the Chairman of the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee, of the Federal Reserve System. Release Morning Newspapers, Sunday, March 4.
14. Andreades, A. (1909). History of the Bank of England 1640-1903. London: P.S. King and Son, Orchard House, Westminster.
15. Barsky, R.B., Kilian, L. (2001). Do We Really Know that Oil Caused the Great Stagflation? A Monetary Alternative. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 16, 137-183. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/654439">doi.org/10.1086/654439">https://doi.org/10.1086/654439
16. Batini, N., Nelson, E. (2005, March). The U.K.’s Rocky Road to Stability. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 020A. Retrieved from research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2005/2005-020.pdf
17. Bordo, M., Siklos, P. (2015, January). Central Bank Credibility: An Historical and Quantitative Exploration. NBER Working Paper.
18. Burns, A.F. (1979). The Anguish of Central Banking. The 1979 Per Jacobsson Lecture. Belgrade: Per Jacobsson Foundation.
19. Capie, F., Fischer, S., et al. (1994). The Future of Central Banking: The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
20. Davies, G. (2002). A History of Money From Ancient Times to the Present Day. 3rd. ed. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
21. Eichengreen, B. (1995). Golden fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. Fellner, W. (1979). The Credibility Effect and Rational Expectations: Implications of the Gramlich Study. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 167-189. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2534307">doi.org/10.2307/2534307">https://doi.org/10.2307/2534307
23. Fergusson, A. (1975). When Money Dies: The Nightmare of the Weimar Collapse. London: William Kimber.
24. Friedman, M., Schwartz, A. J. (1963). A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
25. Friedman, M. (1968). The role of monetary policy. American Economic Review, 68 (1), 1-17.
26. Hammes, D., Wills, D. (2005). Black Gold The End of Bretton Woods and the Oil-Price Shocks of the 1970s. The Independent Review, Spring, IX, 4, 501-511.
27. Manfred, Pohl (Ed.). (1994). Handbook on the History of European Banks. Frankfurt am Main: Edward Elgar.
28. Hetzel, R. (2008). Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754173">doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754173">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754173
29. Holtfrerich, C.-L. (2008). Monetary policy in Germany since 1948: national tradition, international best practice or ideology? In Touffut, J.-P. (Ed.). Central Banks as Economic Institutions. Cheltenham, Northhampton: Edward Elgar.
30. Katz, S. (1959). Radcliffe Report: Monetary Policy and Debt Management Reconciled? In Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System Division of International Finance. Review of Foreign Developments, November 3.
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1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
National model of the Germany banking system: formation, evolution and prospects under globalization
Ekon. teor. 2019; 3:73-100 | https://doi.org/10.15407/etet2019.03.073 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The purpose of the article is, based on the logical and historical analysis of the development of the German banking system, to identify the factors for the formation of financial intermediaries involved in the national economy model and the conditions for their resilience and the ability to transform in the context of existential challenges, in particular globalization and integration processes. The specifics of the German national banking system: powerful family banks, large universal banks, public savings banks and cooperative banks, united in the associations, financial institutions of development was largely determined by the nature of political institutions and industrialization in the country. The prolonged political fragmentation, limiting the possibilities of raising capital, led to the emergence of powerful trading private family banks and public participation in the creation and functioning of banks. Late industrialization and lack of infrastructure contributed to the emergence of large vertically integrated enterprises and large banks, closely linked with them. The ideals of the Reformation, in particular, the rational organization of life and thrift, as well as the propensity of the German government to revolution from above, contributed to the formation of public savings banks to prevent the revolutionary movement. Powerful co-operative movement is also largely due to state policy: in particular, to the moment of the formation the first rural cooperative banks, most peasants already had experienced participating in federal-financed farmers associations. The survival of universal banks, public savings banks and cooperative banks in the context of financial globalization, pushing financial systems to converge with the Anglo-Saxon model, became possible due to the preservation of the "customer-home bank" (lost for large customers) model for small and medium-sized businesses and integration in the model of production of diversified high-quality products, requiring close cooperation between enterprises of large and small and medium-sized businesses. The condition for the survival of cooperative and savings banks was the associational structure, where the central and regional institutes added professionalism, expanded the range of possible operations and searched for new identities under existential challenges. The motives of the state in preserving the institutions of public savings and cooperative banks at different stages were: protection of artisans, farmers and small businesses as important institutions of the German economic and social order; minimizing economic concentration; stimulating competition between banks; supporting federalism through a locally-oriented banking system. The aggregate share of loans to non-banking institutions of banks where profit earning is not the main (or only) statutory goal, according to our calculations, ranged from 52.4% to 61.4% during the years 1970-2017, and from 2012 it does not fall below 60 %. The general mission of public savings, cooperative banks and financial developmental institutions is the economic and social integration of society, support for the federal state system, that is, they are institutes of stability and trust in the broadest sense.
Keywords: national model of banking system, universal banks, public savings banks, cooperative banks, associations, industrialization, globalization, trust
JEL: N23, N24
Article in Russian (pp. 73 - 100) | Download | Downloads :359 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 73 - 100) | Download | Downloads :273 |
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№ 2/2021
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Correction of monetary policy under the influence of corona crisis and long-term factors
Ekon. teor. 2021; 2:65-92 | https://doi.org/10.15407/etet2021.02.065 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The article shows the modification of monetary policy and modification of its interaction with fiscal policy in response to the challenges of the global financial crisis and the corona crisis, as well as reveals potential macroeconomic policy adjustments in response to long-term structural changes in the global economy. The specificity of the global financial and economic crisis, which was caused by financial intermediaries, and the belief in markets efficiency led to the dominance of monetary instruments in combating this crisis. However, purely monetary stimulus does not solve structural problems, and, acting with a very low degree of targeting, but on a huge scale, leads to the debt accumulation and financial crises. The corona crisis forced to resort to budget incentives to ensure targeted support for people and businesses and provided an impetus to discuss the ways to make better use of fiscal policy capacity to increase potential GDP and reduce inequality. The following potential long-term adjustments of macroeconomic policy are revealed: 1) increasing the emphasis on the interests of employees; 2) increasing the inclusiveness of monetary and fiscal policy; 3) the growing role of fiscal policy as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization; 4) revision of the theory of monetary and fiscal policy interaction; 5) revision of the preemptive approach to antiinflation policy, which means the reaction of monetary policy to deviations of the inflation forecast from the target, and the emergence of alternatives: response to the actual achievement and maintenance the inflation target for some time and compensation for the previous deviations from the inflation target; 6) modification of the optimal antiinflationary policy in response to demandpull inflation and cost-push inflation; 7) adjustment of the monetary policy in response to rising inflation due to the exhaustion of long-standing global disinflationary forces that have been in effect since the 1980s; 8) more active monetary and fiscal stimulus in emerging market economies.
Keywords:global financial and economic crisis, corona crisis, monetary policy, fiscal policy, structural changes, inclusiveness
JEL: Е52, E61, E63
Article in Russian (pp. 65 - 92) | Download | Downloads :143 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 65 - 92) | Download | Downloads :128 |
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№ 3/2022
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Global stagflation shocks and the revision of monetary policy: lessons from the crises of the 1970s and 2020s
Ekon. teor. 2022; 3:57-88 | https://doi.org/10.15407/etet2022.03.057 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The article clarifies what lessons for monetary policy under conditions of stag-flationary shocks can be drawn from the analysis of inflation drivers, the global environment and approaches to macroeconomic policy in the runup to and during the oil shocks of the 1970s and the supply shocks of the 2020s, caused by the pandemic and by the global effects of the fullscale war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The following factors have been identified that worsen the situation compared to the crisis of the 1970s for the monetary policy: largerscale geopolitical threats; a wider complex of supply shocks and accelerated restructuring of the energy supply system under the influence of growing geopolitical threats; much more complex global supply chains; the more differentiated nature of countries’ vulnerability to the current supply shocks, that creates new sources of external instability as a result of the growing gap between interest rates and changes in exchange rates; strengthening the global impli-cations of US Fed policy under conditions of stronger global integration; significantly higher levels of private and public debt; intensification of political and economic confrontation between the largest economies of USA and China. It is shown that the more favorable conditions for monetary policy compared to the 1970s are the developed institutional mechanism of antiinflationary monetary policy, smaller institutional opportunities for emerging a wage-price spiral; greater resilience of EMs to external shocks. In order to increase the resistance of national and global economies to stagflationary shocks we need following corrections in monetary policy: decisive antiinflationary policy in the face of threat of proinflationary behavior of economic agents; coordinated optimization and ensuring trust in monetary and fiscal policy, shifting fiscal policy to overcoming aggregate supply constraints; loosening the assumption of abso-lute elasticity of aggregate supply in the world of globalization and technological progress; correction the methods of measuring economic slack and estimation of equilibrium interest rate; adaptation of strategy, communication and tools of monetary policy to conditions of radical uncertainty; expanding the concept of monetary policy inde-pendence in small open EMDEs by taking into account the disproportionately large losses of this group of countries from importing inflation and recession from leading developed economies.
Keywords:stagflation shock, globalization, aggregate supply, monetary policy, fiscal policy, infla-tionary expectations
JEL: E52, E62, E63, E65
Article in Russian (pp. 57 - 88) | Download | Downloads :138 |
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 57 - 88) | Download | Downloads :158 |
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№ 1/2023
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Development of micro- and macroeconomic analysis of financial intermediation Article 1. D. Diamond and Ph. Dybvig theories of banks' intermediary functions and development of microeconomic analysis of financial institutions
Ekon. teor. 2023; 1:73-105 | https://doi.org/10.15407/etet2023.01.073 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The first of two articles which reveal the theoretical and practical significance of the researches awarded 2022 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences. The author shows that the laureates laid the foundations of both the modern microeconomic theory of banks and financial institutions and the analysis of the role of financial intermediation in macroeconomic cycles. It is found that until the 1980s two powerful theoretical traditions dominated in the analysis of financial intermediation. The first tradition was to consider banks primarily as subjects of the money supply. It originates from the controversy between the quantitative theory of money and the real bills doctrine and culminates in the outstanding work by M. Friedman and A. Schwartz. The second tradition was a well-formalized neoclassical approach to the financial system. It was based on the efficient markets hypothesis, the Modigliani-Miller theorem, and the banking the-ory of E. Fama, where financial institutions are only a veil for real economic activities. It is shown that the growth of interest in the micro- and macroeconomic aspects of the financial sector activities in the late 1970s was due to the growth of its power due to the development of technologies and globalization, and due to the emergence of information economic theory which created a theoretical basis for the endogenous derivation of financial intermediaries that overcome market imperfections in ensuring the flow of funds between savers and borrowers. The article reveals the theoretical and practical importance of D. Diamond and Ph. Dybvig’s works, in which a bank endogenously arises as an optimal contract for solving important socio-economic problems of financing longterm projects with liquid deposits and of delegated monitoring of borrowers. The author emphasizes the importance of the scientists’ analysis and formalization of the incentives that determine the peculiarities of the intermediary role of banks and the nature of their services for financial regulation. It is shown that the model of delegated monitoring by D. Diamond not only demonstrates social benefits of specialization in monitoring, but also solves the problem of depositors\' monitoring a bank as a monitor, revealing the incentives for the efficient implementation of borrowers monitoring by the bank: in conditions of diversification of borrowers, when their profits have an independent probability distribution, monitoring helps to avoid liquidation even in the event that part of the borrowers\' projects are not success-ful. It is concluded that the formalization of the banks’ builtin vulnerability in the Diamond-Dybvig model, associated with their function of maturity transformation, and its overcoming by government institutional mechanisms, which, among other things, can distort the banks’ incentives, in effect substantiate the \"symbiosis\" of a state and banks in ensuring the latter’s stable functioning.
Keywords:banks, maturity transformation, delegated monitoring, diversification, multiple equilibria, self-fulfilling prophecy
JEL: G01, G2, B2, B31
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 73 - 105) | Download | Downloads :100 |
REFERENCES ▼
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№ 2/2023
1Institute for Economics and Forecasting, NAS of Ukraine
Development of micro- and macroeconomic analysis of financial intermediation. Article 2. Macroeconomic analysis of the role of financial intermediaries in the works of B. Bernanke and the application of financial intermediation theory in combating fi
Ekon. teor. 2023; 2:71-104 | https://doi.org/10.15407/etet2023.02.071 |
ABSTRACT ▼
The second of two articles which reveal the theoretical and practical significance of the researches awarded 2022 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences. The theoretical and practical significance of B. Bernanke\'s research on the nonmonetary effects of the banking crisis on the course of the Great De-pression, which marked the beginning of recognition and the measurement of the macroeconomic effects of financial intermediaries as institutions performing important functions under information asymmetry, is shown. The peculiarities of the global financial crisis and the latest crisis processes in the banking sector, which are taking place in the conditions of a change in the global monetary environment, are considered in light of the laureates\' works. This change – a rapid tightening of monetary policy in developed economies was a reaction not only to global price shocks associated with a full-scale war Russia\'s invasion of Ukraine, but also to the previous delay in the beginning of the antiinflationary policy in the conditions of a combination of supply shocks with monetary demand stimulation and monetary authorities\' faith in wellanchored inflationary expectations. The extent to which the crisis processes at Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, First Republic Bank and Credit Suisse are described by the models developed by the 2022 Nobel laureates was considered. The answer to the question about the role of banking panics in the market economy was ad-justed in the light of the results of this analysis. Probable directions for reforming banking regulation in the USA are characterized. It is substantiated that the state faces a complex set of tasks: to minimize social losses from banking panics; to prevent large business losses that would have broad macroeconomic conse-quences; to prevent irrational contagion with panic moods and panic as a self-fulfilling prophecy, but not to eliminate the very possibility of depositors fleeing from a bank with poor management. It is shown that increasing and complicating of state presence in the financial sector has an extremely powerful and difficult to assess influence on the incentives of financial intermediaries, which embody their nature as special economic subjects.
Keywords:cost of credit intermediation, credit channel of monetary transmission, global financial crisis, banking regulation, interest rate risk, deposit insurance
JEL: G01, G2, B2, B31
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 71 - 104) | Download | Downloads :111 |
REFERENCES ▼
2. Grytsenko, A., Krychevska, T. (2007). Formation of the informational-behavioral paradigm of monetary policy. Ekon. teor. – Economic theory, 2: 46-69. Re-trieved from etet.org.ua/docs/ET_07_2_46_uk.pdf [in Ukrainian].
3. Dovbenko, M. (2014). A nobel prize for the researchers of the financial markets. Ekon. teor. – Economic theory, 1: 91-107. Retrieved from etet.org.ua/docs/ET_14_1_91_uk.pdf [in Ukrainian].
4. Kornivska, V.O. (2021). Financial non-freedom in the new society. Ekon. teor. – Economic theory, 1: 41-66. doi.org/10.15407/etet2021.01.041 [in Ukrain-ian].
5. Krychevska, T.O. (2022a). Global stagflation shocks and the revision of monetary policy: lessons from the crises of the 1970s and 2020s. Ekon. teor. – Eco-nomic theory, 3: 57-88. doi.org/10.15407/etet2022.03.057 [in Ukrainian].
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