Despite all “non-market” nature of reciprocal interactions, it would be excessive to
deny the invisible calculation of network transfers, that is, the accountability of the
given and the received. In this paper, by combining the historical and the logical,
the author establishes that there is a rather fine line between the reciprocal ex
change and the types of corruptive behavior. The common components relate to
the quality of the basis and the background, which indicates the nature and origin
of corruptive practices. The exceptional and unique is manifested in different
forms of manifestation of the general. The relations of trust, whose meaning is
revealed based on the presented tree of the game, act as the general. The forms
of manifestation of corruptive behavior have been distinguished by the method of
classification. It has been noted that a reliable "safeguard" of opportunistic beha
vior in reciprocal exchange is a system of strict social standards.
If market agreements are ensured by formal sanctions or informal forcible me
thods, violation of unwritten rules of conduct in the economy of gift exchange is
punishable by deprivation of trust, which means excluding the entity that has not
lived up to expectations from the network of reciprocal interactions. It has been
noted that transaction costs under the conditions of reciprocity are quite low, be
cause the exchange relations are personalized, and the importance of the gift is
determined by its subjective value to those to whom the gift is offered. It has been
established that on the one hand, the exchange of gifts and incentives within rea
sonable limits can be a socially acceptable component of successful business re
lations. However, on the other hand, if a person is authorized to perform state
functions, a gift may be offered to him/her for the purpose of bribery and/or in
citement to abuse of power. Since the top-down fight against corruption, as a
rule, does not affect those stable and dominant stereotypes of public conscious
ness, standards and values that have been nurtured for decades and even hun
dreds of years. Thus, when developing policies to minimize corruption, it is rec
ommended to use the methodology and results of research in the field of beha
vioral economics, which determines the promising areas for research on this issue
Keywords:reciprocity, reciprocal exchange, corruption, corruptive behavior
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