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№ 2020/4

Institutional problems of economic development


IVASHUK Yurii 1

1Ternopil National Economic University

Possibility of the transformation of reciprocal exchange into manifestations of corruptive behavior

Ekon. teor. 2020; 4:66-77https://doi.org/10.15407/etet2020.04.066


ABSTRACT ▼


JEL: D91, C90

Article in Russian (pp. 65 - 77) DownloadDownloads :121
Article in Ukrainian (pp. 65 - 77) DownloadDownloads :172

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